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THE NEWEST SPECTATOR SPORT:
WHY EXTENDING VICTIMS’ RIGHTS TO THE
SPECTATORS’ GALLERY ERODES THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
SIERRA ELIZABETH†
ABSTRACT
A criminal defendant in the United States is innocent until proven
guilty and has a Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and an impartial
jury. Although the American criminal justice system generally goes to
great lengths to afford defendants these constitutional rights,
competing interests may, if not carefully monitored, undermine these
bedrock principles. This Note argues that a new practice, stemming
from the victims’ rights movement and developing in criminal
courtrooms across the country, is one such competing interest. This
new practice—spectator demonstrations—allows crime victims’
family members and supporters to display ribbons, buttons, T-shirts,
signs, family urns, or any other written or symbolic message to the
jury while sitting in the audience section of the courtroom, also known
as the spectators’ gallery. Although the cathartic nature of the
demonstration may provide benefits to the victims, this Note argues
that the prejudicial effects on the jury and resulting contravention of
the defendant’s constitutional rights far outweigh any such
justification. Consequently, this Note proposes that courts limit
victims’ rights in this area and ban spectator demonstrations
completely to eliminate the per se unacceptable risk that they create.
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INTRODUCTION
At least 217 defendants have taken their seat in a courtroom and
1
listened to the deafening sounds of injustice : the underlying
reverberations of poverty, the vigorous drum of coercion and deceit,
the exploding bombshells of misidentification and faulty evidence,
2
and the babbling echo of bad lawyering. Fortunately, all 217 of these
defendants, subjected to the failings of the criminal justice system,
3
have been exonerated by DNA evidence. Accordingly, these DNA
exoneration statistics, as well as the fear that this group may only
constitute a fraction of those convicted of crimes they did not
4
commit, stimulate interest in identifying “the fundamental flaws in
5
the criminal justice system that lead to wrongful convictions.”
One source of identifiable concern is the victims’ rights
6
movement, responsible for increasing victim involvement and
allowing victims the right to be present and heard at various critical
stages of judicial proceedings. Although victims’ rights are often
7
revered as positive additions to the system, every additional victims’
1. As of June 1, 2008, 217 people in the United States have been wrongfully convicted of a
crime and exonerated through DNA evidence. Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.
org (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
2. This recasts the Innocence Project’s seven most common causes of wrongful
convictions: (1) eyewitness misidentification, (2) unreliable or limited science, (3) false
confessions, (4) forensic science fraud or misconduct, (5) government misconduct, (6)
informants or snitches, and (7) bad lawyering. Innocence Project, Understand the Causes,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
3. Innocence Project, supra note 1.
4. See Innocence Project, supra note 2 (“Those exonerated by DNA testing aren’t the
only people who have been wrongfully convicted in recent decades. For every case that involves
DNA, there are thousands that do not.”).
5. See id. (describing how the number of DNA exonerations has brought attention to the
problems inherent in the criminal justice system and the necessity of fixing the system).
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 2005 BYU L. REV.
835, 837 (“[O]nly by integrating victims into the federal rules will Congress’s goal of making
victims participants in the process be fully realized.”); Karyn Ellen Polito, Note, The Rights of
Crime Victims in the Criminal Justice System: Is Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?, 16 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 241, 241 (1990) (“Victims of crime should have
recognized roles in the judicial system.”); Note, Victims’ Roles in the Criminal Justice System: A
Fallacy of Victim Empowerment?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 225, 236–37 (1992)
(discussing several advantages of victim participation). But see Robert C. Black, Forgotten
Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim Participation in Sentencing, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 227
(1994) (“It is a source of outrage to some that defendants enjoy more rights than victims. It
ought not to be. . . . Victims’ rights bestowed by statute are necessarily subordinate to
defendants’ constitutional rights in case of conflict.” (citation omitted)).
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right raises the question: is the right eroding the defendant’s
8
presumption of innocence and constitutional right to a fair trial?
Much of the existing research on victims’ rights has concerned victim
9
impact statements at sentencing hearings, victim involvement in plea
10
bargaining, mandated victim involvement in domestic violence
11
cases, and the potential effects of victim involvement on a
prosecutor’s ability to remain a neutral and impartial “minister of
12
justice.” Creating arguably one of the most divisive debates about
victims’ rights, however, are victim or spectator demonstrations in the
courtroom during trial, which have further entangled the victim in the
criminal justice system. To put the issue into context, consider the
following scenario:
Everyday, juror number five sits in a wooden jury box. He and
eleven other jurors have sworn, under oath, to be impartial fact
finders despite the highly publicized nature of the criminal murder
trial in which they sit. Juror number five attempts to focus on the
expert witness of the day, but notices that a little girl in the spectators’
gallery is holding a brass urn. In fact, he notices this little girl every

8. See, e.g., Rachel King, Why a Victims’ Rights Constitutional Amendment Is a Bad Idea:
Practical Experiences from Crime Victims, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 362 (2000) (“By endowing
constitutional rights on a ‘victim’ after a person has been accused of a crime, but before
conviction, there is a presumption made that the accused is in fact guilty. This erodes the
presumption of innocence—a cornerstone of our criminal justice system.”); see also Erin Ann
O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229, 233–34 (2005)
(“[V]ictim involvement in the criminal process is becoming and will continue to be a reality of
our criminal justice process. . . . As a consequence, advocates must think creatively about how to
provide victims with participation at a minimal cost to existing procedural protections for
defendants.”).
9. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“A State may legitimately conclude
that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is
relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.”).
10. See Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301,
303–04 (1987) (examining whether victims should be afforded a right to participate in the plea
bargain); David A. Starkweather, Note, The Retributive Theory of “Just Deserts” and Victim
Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 854 (1992) (discussing how victim
participation can be a positive addition to the plea bargaining process).
11. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1856 (1996) (discussing the tension behind
requiring a victim to testify in a domestic violence case).
12. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s Duty
of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 561 (2005) (discussing potential ethical conflicts
that may develop as a result of victim involvement); see also Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:
Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 132
(2004) (discussing the barriers that impede prosecutorial neutrality).
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day. She belongs to the select group of people who sit in the front
row, across from the bailiffs’ post, and watch the trial.
During the first week, the group passed out T-shirts. Although
juror number five hardly gave them a second glance because the Tshirt graphics were too small to read, last week he definitely noticed
the bright-orange buttons they all wore showing the face of the
murder victim. It was only then that he realized this group was the
family of the murder victim, and their involvement began to make
him a little uneasy.
Today, there are one, two, three . . . six of them. As juror number
five drudges through what he hopes to be the last expert witness, he
cannot help but stare at the brass urn that sits on the little girl’s lap.
He studies its detail and wonders whether it contains the remains of
the little girl’s father. He wonders what the family members are
thinking, why they feel so strongly about the defendant’s guilt, and
whether they will be able to go on after this tragedy. And suddenly he
feels an immense pressure as he realizes that the defendant’s fate—
and the family’s fate—is solely in his and the other juror’s hands.
This example illustrates various forms of spectator
demonstrations—courtroom displays, worn, held, or otherwise touted
by a crime victim’s family member or supporter during the
proceedings at trial. Although the example is only speculative of a
juror’s actual thoughts, the example is well within the realm of
possibilities. Spectators have already donned large colorful buttons or
13
badges depicting their loved ones, buttons advocating for a certain
14
15
cause, ribbons, T-shirts with written or symbolic messages on
16
17
them, and urns containing their loved ones’ ashes. Furthermore, to

13. E.g., Nguyen v. State, 977 S.W.2d 450, 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (describing how
defendant asked that spectators be “ordered to remove large buttons portraying a color
photograph of the deceased”).
14. E.g., Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing how defendant
“contended that jurors were in the presence of a large number of women wearing ‘Women
Against Rape’ buttons”).
15. E.g., In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 616 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (describing how victims’
family members wore “black and orange remembrance ribbons while in the courtroom”).
16. E.g., State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 29 (Kan. 1998) (“[T]he family members were wearing
t-shirts with a picture of [the victim] on them.”).
17. There are no cases that discuss urns. While conducting interviews in preparation for
this Note, however, one prosecutor who overheard the interview added that one of her victim’s
family members brought an urn with the victim’s remains into the courtroom, apparently for
others to see, and the judge was going to have to rule on it. For an explanation of the prosecutor
interviews conducted for this Note, see infra note 23.
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18

bring attention to their displays, some have cradled sleeping babies,
19
20
walked in and out of the courtroom, or served refreshments.
Consequently, the question posed here is twofold: why are spectator
demonstrations allowed, and are they potentially biasing the jury and
trial outcomes?
In answering these questions, this Note suggests that the
phenomenon of allowing spectator demonstrations is the result of the
victims’ rights movement, which has influenced courts to adopt legal
balancing tests that award rights to both spectators and defendants.
These legal balancing tests, however, only create confusion in the
courts and qualify guaranteed constitutional protections. This Note
argues that this technique, especially in light of the possible
prejudicial effects that spectator demonstrations may have on the
jury—including diverting jurors’ attention, creating biased priming
manipulations, and altering courtroom availability heuristics—is
fundamentally flawed. Fortunately, in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that it had not previously applied a legal balancing test to
spectator conduct and that it was “an open question in our
21
jurisprudence,” creating an opportunity to implement a new,
uniform standard in the law. By illuminating the inherent
inconsistencies and inadequacies that stem from legal balancing tests
applied in this context, which allow courts to unevenly apply the law,
this Note contends that courts should ban spectator demonstrations
completely, arguing that in and of themselves spectator
demonstrations create a per se unacceptable risk.
This Note consists of three parts. Part I tracks the evolution of
the case law regarding spectator conduct in and around the
courtroom. Part II introduces the Supreme Court’s pivotal 2006
22
decision, Carey v. Musladin, and illustrates the competing views on
23
spectator demonstrations through prosecutorial anecdotes. Part III
18. See State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449, 454 (W. Va. 1985) (“Some cradled sleeping
infants in their laps and all prominently displayed their MADD buttons.”).
19. See State v. Nelson, 705 So. 2d 758, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (“The court further
requested that the spectators not wander in and out of the courtroom, but rather remain seated,
so as to minimize the effect of the t-shirts.”).
20. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1990) (contending that the button wearers
“served refreshments outside the courtroom on behalf of the state”).
21. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653–54 (2006).
22. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006).
23. In preparation for this Note, prosecutors were interviewed about their experiences,
relationships, and views about victim and spectator conduct in the courtroom. The interviews
were conducted in 2007 and 2008 with current and former state prosecutors across the country.
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rebuts the pro–spectator rights arguments set forth in Part II and
argues for a total ban on spectator demonstrations. First, it dispels the
myth that a victim or spectator has a First Amendment right to free
speech in the courtroom that deserves heightened protection. Second,
it discusses the ways in which spectator demonstrations may prejudice
the jury. This Note concludes that courts ought to completely ban
spectator demonstrations because “the risk of prejudice [is] profound,
24
[and] the burden of alleviating that risk [is] minimal.”
I. THE EVOLUTION: FROM DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
TO SPECTATORS’ RIGHTS
Spectator conduct in the courtroom has evolved from unruly
spectators who scream, laugh, and point to “well-behaved” spectators
who flaunt their signs, buttons, and T-shirts. Surprisingly, however,
not only has the conduct itself evolved but also, and more
importantly, the ideologies of the judges have evolved. Whereas
judges were once willing and maybe even anxious to prevent
prejudicial convictions, the evolving case law suggests a willingness to
disregard potential prejudicial effects of spectator demonstrations.
Why is this happening? Is the explicit message of an outburst more
detrimental than the implicit message of a silent demonstration? Has
the image of the weak and susceptible juror been replaced by that of
the impervious mental giant unaffected by extraneous influences? Or,
are twenty and twenty-first-century courts simply willing to give
spectators, the majority of whom are victims, a little more freedom?
This Part tracks the evolution of the law, suggesting that the advent of
victims’ rights and the fact that many demonstrators are victims or
victims’ family members has contributed to the judiciary’s response to
spectator demonstrations.
A. Historical Treatment of Spectators
Historically, courts have been quick to shield juries from the
potentially biasing influence of third parties in the courtroom. In pre–
victims’ rights cases, interruptions to court proceedings primarily

All prosecutors were guaranteed anonymity. Therefore, their responses throughout the Note
are only identifiable by number.
24. Norris, 918 F.2d at 834.
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25

involved spectator outbursts. Spectator outbursts occur when
courtroom audience members engage in behavior that is typically
spontaneous, such as “applause, laughter, yells and shrieks, or
26
statements,” during court proceedings. After such an outburst, it was
27
not uncommon for judges to grant a new trial. Because judges had
difficulty preventing outbursts completely, however, when evaluating
an outburst’s prejudicial effect, reviewing courts evaluated the judge’s
28
actions. When a judge promptly and effectively terminated the
29
possibility of a reoccurrence, the verdict stood. On the other hand,
when the judge failed to immediately restore order in the court,
appellate courts often reversed the verdict for fear that the failure to
30
quell the outburst contributed to an unfair trial. Furthermore, many
courts held that individual jurors’ opinions about whether they could
disregard the demonstration and render an unbiased verdict were

25. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Disruptive Conduct of Spectators in Presence
of Jury During Criminal Trial as Basis for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 29 A.L.R. 4TH 659
(1984) (detailing spectator demonstrations in a variety of cases).
26. Id. § 2.
27. See id. (describing a number of situations in which courts granted new trials when
“prejudice in fact resulted or might have occurred”).
28. See id. (leaving “[t]he decision of whether the jury was or possibly could have been
influenced [by a spectator demonstration] . . . [primarily] up to the discretion of the trial court”).
29. See, e.g., Hallman v. United States, 410 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C. 1979) (affirming a denial of
a request for a mistrial when a woman in the public seating area of the courtroom began to cry
during the prosecutor’s opening statement, because the individual was taken out of the
courtroom and the judge immediately admonished the jury to decide the case only on the facts);
Stevens v. State, 20 S.E. 331, 331 (Ga. 1893) (syllabus by the court) (finding no cause for a new
trial when “the presiding judge promptly rebuked the offender, and had him removed from the
court room”); State v. Wheelock, 254 N.W. 313, 316 (Iowa 1934) (“The outburst was promptly
suppressed . . . . [and] the trial court had the entire situation well in hand.”); Shimniok v. State,
19 So. 2d 760, 766 (Miss. 1944) (en banc) (finding no grounds for reversal when the judge
restored order to the courtroom after an outburst and “instructed the sheriff that all persons
must be seated; that there was to be no talking, or comments, or show of pleasure or
displeasure, and that quiet must prevail in the courtroom”); Floyd v. State, 148 So. 226, 232
(Miss. 1933) (finding a fair trial when the audience “applauded because they thought the jury
selection had been completed and that the trial on its merits would proceed [and] [t]he judge
stated that there should be no more applause”).
30. See, e.g., Stumph v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Ky. 1966) (noting that it is
“the duty of the court to maintain order in the courtroom. . . . [and] the trial court should take
appropriate action” when there is a spectator outburst); Hickox v. State, 253 S.W. 823, 830 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1923) (“The court should have sharply reprimanded the audience . . . [and] if this
did not have the desired effect [the judge] should have promptly cleared the courtroom of
spectators . . . [and] if this could not be accomplished, then the defendant should have been
promptly granted a new trial.”); Manning v. State, 39 S.W. 118, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1897)
(reversing a conviction for slander because the trial judge, after one demonstration, should have
curtailed any subsequent actions).
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irrelevant, and to ask them for such opinions midtrial was
31
unnecessary. Although judges understood that not all spectator
32
outbursts could be remedied by overturning convictions, curative
steps taken to quell those acts were important when evaluating
33
34
prejudice and determining whether to grant a new trial. Overall,
this behavior by reviewing courts shows that spectator outbursts were
seen as per se unacceptable risks in pre–victims’ rights cases.
In addition to this historical procedural protocol, U.S. Supreme
Court decisions reveal a consistent, historical concern for preventing
third parties from prejudicing juries. For instance, in Turner v.
35
Louisiana, the Supreme Court focused on the importance of an
36
“impartial” and “indifferent” jury. In Turner, two sheriffs were in
37
charge of the jury. Specifically, these sheriffs “drove the jurors to a
restaurant for each meal,” took them to their “lodgings each night,”
38
and were otherwise closely associated with them. Therefore, the
39
judge reversed the defendant’s conviction when the same sheriffs

31. See, e.g., Woolfolk v. State, 8 S.E. 724, 727 (Ga. 1889) (holding that the combination of
applause and screams of “hang him” warranted a new trial because “[t]he question here is not
what effect these things did have upon the minds of the jury, but what effect they were
calculated to produce”); State v. Henry, 198 So. 910, 923 (La. 1940) (“It was, therefore, error for
the trial judge to substitute for his own opinion the conclusions of the jurors as to the effect and
influence that the extraneous misconduct of bystanders and spectators had on them.”).
32. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 25 S.W. 967, 967–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894) (“[T]o make a
rule that a judgment will be reversed because of such applauding, in all cases, though promptly
suppressed and reprimanded, would be very dangerous indeed. A person . . . would not hesitate
to have his friends ready and willing to applaud counsel for the state . . . .”).
33. See, e.g., Hendry v. State, 112 So. 212, 214 (Ala. 1927) (“Misconduct of bystanders . . . is
highly reprehensible, and should not be tolerated. When it occurs, it should be promptly and
vigorously suppressed in such manner that the jury is made to see the ugliness and injustice of
such demonstration.”). Another state court held that immediate remedial action by the trial
court could prevent a mistrial:
[W]here, as here, improper audience behaviour is purely fortuitous and where the
court takes immediate steps to quell it and to admonish the jury and the spectators to
assure no prejudice to the accused, a mistrial may not be required if the audience
misbehaviour may be reasonably viewed as not having unduly influenced the jury.
State v. Allen, 276 So. 2d 868, 871 (La. 1973).
34. See, e.g., Zitter, supra note 25, § 3(a) (“[D]isruptive conduct of spectators in the
presence of the jury during the selection of the jury or during the opening arguments constituted
a basis for a reversal, or the granting of motions for a new trial or mistrial.”).
35. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
36. Id. at 471 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)).
37. Id. at 467.
38. Id. at 468.
39. Id. at 474.
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40

subsequently testified as witnesses for the prosecution. The Court
specified that the jury’s verdict “must be based upon the evidence
41
developed at the trial” and that “in spite of forms [juries] are
42
extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.”
The Court also noted that “even if it could be assumed that the
[sheriffs] never did discuss the case directly with any members of the
jury,” the continual interaction between those witnesses and the jury
43
suggested extreme prejudice. In ruling for the defendant, the Court
recognized that a “trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies
at the very least that the ‘evidence developed’ against a defendant
shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there
is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of
44
cross-examination, and of counsel.”
Similarly, when confronting the disruptive nature of the media
45
46
the following year in Estes v. Texas and Sheppard v. Maxwell, the
Court scrutinized other outside influences in the courtroom.
Concluding that the media prevented a fair trial in Estes, the Court
noted that the “mass of wires, television cameras, microphones and
47
48
photographers” may have distracted the jurors. Furthermore, the
Court stated, “distractions are not caused solely by the physical
presence of the camera . . . . Human nature being what it is, not only
will a juror’s eyes be fixed on the camera, but also his mind will be
49
preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testimony.” In
Sheppard, quoting Justice Holmes, the Court declared, “[t]he theory
of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any

40. Id. at 468.
41. Id. at 472 (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722).
42. Id. (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
43. Id. at 473.
44. Id. at 472–73 (emphasis added) (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722). In Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965), the Court also upheld a Louisiana statute prohibiting picketing or parading
near a court, id. at 564. “A State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that
the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence.” Id. at 562.
Furthermore, “the legislature has the right to recognize the danger that some judges, jurors, and
other court officials, will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in or
near their courtrooms both prior to and at the time of the trial.” Id. at 565.
45. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
46. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
47. Estes, 381 U.S. at 550.
48. Id. at 546.
49. Id.
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outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.”
Concluding that the jury’s subjective assessment of prejudice was not
51
dispositive and that the judge “did not fulfill his duty . . . to control
52
[the] disruptive influences in the courtroom,” the Supreme Court
53
remanded the case.
For the sake of preventing jury prejudice, the Court has also
administered control over the clothing and appearance of criminal
54
defendants. In Estelle v. Williams, for example, the “accused [was]
55
compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury.”
Noting that “jail clothing furthers no essential state policy,” the Court
determined that the “constant reminder of the accused’s condition
implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror’s
judgment. . . . [and] an unacceptable risk is presented of
56
impermissible factors coming into play.” Even though the verdict
was ultimately upheld because the defense did not properly make an
57
objection to the court, Williams established that the State could no
longer compel a defendant to stand trial wearing identifiable prison
clothing.
58
In another case, Holbrook v. Flynn, “four uniformed state
troopers [sat] in the first row of the spectators’ [gallery]” behind the
59
six defendants. Upholding the conviction, the Court stated that
60
“maintaining custody during the proceedings” was extremely
61
important. Therefore, when the four uniformed officers were only
there to provide security and did not overwhelm the room, an
62
unacceptable risk of prejudice was simply not present. Nevertheless,
the Court qualified its holding by stating, “[w]e do not minimize the
threat that a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen might
63
pose” and “we might express a preference that officers providing
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351 (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
Id.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 512.
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 571–72.
Id. at 570–72.
Id. at 570.
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courtroom security in federal courts not be easily identifiable by
64
jurors as guards.” The Court thus seemed to retain its protective
principles related to potential jury prejudice in the courtroom even
though the State had a “legitimate interest in maintaining custody” of
65
the defendant in the case.
All of these cases suggest that historically, assuring an impartial
jury took precedence over other competing interests, including the
rights of third parties. Thus, the distortion of these established
principles by select lower courts, allowing increased third-party
presence in spectator demonstrations, seems unwarranted. Upon
second glance, however, this shift in the balance between concern for
jury prejudice and third-party rights came at the heels of a movement
that brought third-party rights to the forefront of the criminal justice
system and may have contributed to the abrupt shift in judicial
philosophy.
B. Enter Victims’ Rights
In colonial America, individual victims of crime were the ones in
66
charge of “law enforcement and the administration of justice.” In
the early eighteenth century, however, as the broader criminal-justice
goals of deterrence and retribution started to garner support, onceprivate criminal prosecutions became public, and individual victims of
67
crime had to yield their control to government prosecutors. It was
not until the 1970s, at the start of the victims’ rights movement, that
victims finally started to regain their footing in the eyes of the
68
arguably unreceptive government-run criminal justice system. With
the creation of President Ronald Reagan’s President’s Task Force on
69
Victims of Crime in the 1980s and the work of the National Victims
70
Constitutional Amendment Network in the 1990s, the movement
71
truly came into its own.

64. Id. at 572. Furthermore, the Court upheld the long-existing view that a juror’s opinion
of the prejudicial nature of the incident is not dispositive. Id. at 570.
65. Id.
66. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen
Years After the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 21, 25 (1999).
67. Id. at 21–27.
68. Id. at 27–29.
69. Exec. Order No. 12,360, 47 Fed. Reg. 17, 975 (Apr. 23, 1982).
70. See Robert P. Mosteller, Victims’ Rights and the Constitution: Moving from
Guaranteeing Participatory Rights to Benefiting the Prosecution, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1053, 1055
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“By the end of 1994, twenty states had adopted victims’ rights
amendments,” and in 1995, the first victims’ rights amendment to the
72
U.S. Constitution was proposed. Since then, all fifty states and the
federal government have enacted victims’ rights statutes and, in some
73
cases, state constitutional amendments. Congress also passed the
74
Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, helping to solidify the victim’s
75
place within the system. Although there is no consensus for the
76
underlying philosophies of victims’ rights among advocates, this
widespread implementation and codification of victims’ rights
throughout the country has substantially changed the culture of
criminal law.
One scholar notes, “Victims’ rights has emerged . . . as one of the
most important social movements of our time, comparable in its
influence on our political culture to the civil rights movement or

(1998) (stating that the National Victims Constitutional Amendment Network “represent[ed] all
major victims’ rights organizations”).
71. See Tobolowsky, supra note 66, at 29–31 (discussing how “victim participation in the
criminal justice process has increased exponentially in the fifteen years since the issuance of the
Task Force Final Report”).
72. Mosteller, supra note 70, at 1055. A constitutional amendment has not been adopted.
See H.R. Res. 10, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States to protect the rights of crime victims).
73. Protections vary from state to state and often include the right to be present and heard
at all critical stages of judicial proceedings, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01; the right to
restitution, e.g., The Property Crime Restitution and Compensation Act, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19-4801 to -13 (2006); the right be informed and make a statement at sentencing, e.g., WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 35; and the right to a timely disposition of the case, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. I, §
24, cl. 1. The federal system has also implemented legislation providing rights to crime victims.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (2006) (“[A] United States district court shall not order any victim of
an offense excluded from the trial of a defendant accused of that offense.”).
74. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261–65 (2004) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) and to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603(d)–(e)).
75. The rights include (1) the “right to be reasonably protected”; (2) the right to
“reasonable, accurate, and timely notice . . . involving the crime or of release or escape of the
accused”; (3) the right not to be excluded (absent clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary); (4) the “right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding”; (5) the “reasonable
right to confer with the attorney for the Government”; (6) the “right to full and timely
restitution”; (7) the “right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay”; and (8) the “right to
be treated with fairness and with respect.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). For a discussion of the possible
effects of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, see Matthew B. Riley, Note, Victim
Participation in the Criminal Justice System: In re Kenna and Victim Access to Presentence
Reports, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 235, 235–53.
76. See Mosteller, supra note 70, at 1054 (identifying three groups of advocates: (1) those
with the goal of attaining participatory rights, (2) those with a pro-prosecution slant, and (3)
those who want greater victim aid and protection from the government).
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feminism.” Although jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they
involve victims, “[t]he role of the victim in the legal process [can start]
at the beginning of a criminal case,” when the government determines
whether to “press charges” or offer a plea bargain, can continue to
trial, in the form of victim testimony, and might not end until the
78
sentencing, probation, or parole stage, postconviction. Criminal laws
themselves are also being defined “in part by reference to the status
or characteristics of the victim . . . even when the defendant is not
79
aware of such characteristics.” Furthermore, “as socio-legal scholar
Jonathan Simon reminded us [in 2000]: . . . [a]lmost all demographic
segments of the population, and both political parties, supported
80
[Victims’ Rights] measures,” effectively reinforcing the prevalence
81
of sympathy for crime victims. The heightened awareness of victims
in the criminal justice system, however, has influenced not only
legislation but also judges’ decisions, such as approving spectator
demonstrations.
C. Resulting Jurisprudence: Spectator Demonstrations
As spectator conduct in the courtroom evolved from outbursts to
demonstrations, lower court judges were forced to determine whether
in certain circumstances spectator demonstrations could warrant a
new trial in the way that spectator outbursts once did. Importantly,
these judges were asked to weigh in on this issue beginning in the
82
1980s, which coincided with the newly publicized victims’ rights
83
movement. This Section contends that although both spectator
outbursts and demonstrations are disruptive in nature, the backdrop
of the victims’ rights movement garnered greater consideration for
sympathetic victims and their cause when courts were first deciding
spectator demonstrations cases. Therefore, instead of promptly
77. Jonathan Simon, Megan’s Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1136 (2000).
78. Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 654–60 (2003).
79. Id. at 658 (referring specifically to assault laws and hate-crime legislation).
80. Vik Kinwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-Centered
Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 232 (2002).
81. Cf. id. at 233 (“Certainly, the popular sympathy for crime victims is so prevalent that
there might eventually be sufficient political mobilization to secure the passage of a measure
like . . . the proposed Victim’s Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
82. For a discussion of court decisions regarding spectator demonstrations, see infra Parts
I.C.1–3.
83. For a discussion of the timeline of the victims’ rights movement, see supra Part I.B.
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terminating spectator conduct as they had in the outburst cases,
many courts were willing to weigh the extent of the particular
85
spectator demonstration and give the victims more leeway.
Unfortunately, this gesture of respect for those experiencing the loss
of a loved one may endanger the constitutional principles that shape
the foundation of the criminal justice system. Yet the resulting
jurisprudence reveals that not all courts have fallen prey to this
phenomenon and have upheld the cautionary ideals of the past (the
status-quo courts). Many courts, however, have given more weight to
victims’ or spectators’ rights by allowing them to demonstrate during
trial (the pro-victim courts), a practice this Note argues is a mistake.
Finally, other courts remain unclear as to what the law for spectator
demonstrations should be, especially when determining whether to
apply a legal balancing test (the unsettled courts).
1. Status-Quo Courts. Although their approaches vary, the
status-quo courts seem willing to overturn convictions in cases in
which spectator demonstrations occur, similar to the precedent set by
reviewing courts in spectator-outburst cases. For example, in State v.
86
Franklin, “ten to thirty [Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD)]
87
demonstrators . . . sat directly in front of the jury.” “Some cradled
sleeping infants in their laps and all prominently displayed their
88
MADD buttons.” Concerned about the defendant’s right to a fair
trial, the court ruled for the defendant and stated, “the [lower] court’s
cardinal failure in this case was to take no action whatever against a
predominant group of ordinary citizens who were tooth and nail
89
opposed to any finding that the defendant was not guilty.”
In a murder prosecution in which the trial court did take action
and “sternly admonished” the victim’s family members and ordered
them to stop wearing large buttons and holding childhood pictures
90
depicting the victim, the appellate court did not find prejudice.
91
Similarly, in State v. Lord, the defendant objected when thirteen out

84. See supra Part I.A.
85. See infra Part I.C.2.
86. State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W. Va. 1985).
87. Id. at 454.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 455.
90. Mitchell v. State, 884 P.2d 1186, 1196 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001).
91. State v. Lord, 114 P.3d 1241 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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of thirty-one spectators wore buttons portraying the victim on the
92
first day of trial. At first, the trial court refused to exclude the
93
buttons. Two days later, however, the judge directed the spectators
94
to remove the buttons. Upholding the conviction, the court of
appeals noted, “Although the better practice would have been to
have prohibited the buttons in the courthouse at first sight, the trial
court later ordered the buttons removed, in spite of the absence of
prejudice. . . . [to] avoid[] the possibility of future contamination of
95
the jury and prejudice to [the defendant].”
96
In Norris v. Risley, a group of women spectators wore “Women
97
Against Rape” buttons during the trial. The court, noting that “[t]he
98
women . . . obviously intended to convey a message,” held that the
exposure to the buttons constituted an unacceptably high risk of
99
prejudice in light of the presumption of innocence, the right of
100
101
confrontation, and the right of cross-examination. Finally, in
another trial that involved the murder of a prison guard, when it
appeared that “[a]bout half of the spectators [wore] prison guard
102
uniforms,” the court determined that the demonstration, combined
103
with the pretrial publicity of the case, “marred” the trial. “The
officers . . . were there for one reason: they hoped to show solidarity
with the killed correctional officer . . . [and] communicate a message
104
to the jury,” a message that the “jury could not help but receive.”
2. Pro-Victim Courts. In contrast, pro-victim courts depart from
the status quo and grant extensive rights to spectators. They do so not
only by inquiring into spectators’ motives and jurors’ assessments of
potential prejudice but also by trivializing spectator outbursts in a

92. Id. at 1244.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1245.
96. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 829–30.
98. Id. at 832.
99. Id. at 831.
100. Id. at 833.
101. Id.
102. Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1458 (11th Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 1459. The Court, however, clarified its decision in this case, stating “[w]e do not
mean to imply that presumed prejudice can occur only when there is a combination of
courtroom demonstrations and pretrial publicity.” Id. at 1460 n.12.
104. Id. at 1459–60.
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way earlier courts did not. For example, in In re Woods, the
victims’ family members wore “black and orange remembrance
107
ribbons while in the courtroom.” When the defendant asked the
judge to order them to remove the ribbons, the judge decided to
“ask[] for comment from some of the spectators who were wearing
108
the ribbons.” After the parent of the murder victim told the judge
that the ribbons were “‘[j]ust representative of my daughter and the
tragedy that has taken place’ . . . the trial court declined to order the
109
removal of the ribbons.” On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Washington noted that the ribbons “were simply ribbons that the
110
wearers indicated they wore in memory of the victims.” Citing a
juror, the court continued, “In fact, juror Randall Thornburg
stated . . . . ‘I thought the ribbons were nice, but they did not
111
influence my decision or that of the other jurors.’” In another
homicide prosecution, “the spectator cried and yelled the victim’s
name for about [thirty-five] seconds,” while a forensic pathologist was
112
testifying. Rejecting the motion for mistrial, the court reasoned that
because “[t]he spectator never accused defendant of the victim’s
murder” and the jury members were told to “disregard the spectator’s
113
comments,” there was no constitutional error.
3. Unsettled Courts. Many of the defendants who ultimately
lose their appeals after trial courts fail to grant mistrials are in
jurisdictions that are unclear as to how they should treat spectator
demonstrations. For example, many unsettled courts focus on a
procedural flaw in the case and avoid the substantive issue. In Pachl
114
v. Zenon, for example, the court proposed that defense counsel’s
failure to object to button wearers was likely a reasonable “tactical

105. For a description of courts’ reluctance to take into account an individual juror’s opinion
about prejudice and the overall concern for the potential risk of prejudice on the jury before the
advent of the victims’ rights movement, see supra Part I.A.
106. In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
107. Id. at 616.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 617.
112. State v. Wilson, 826 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
113. Id.; cf. Kinnamon v. Scott, 40 F.3d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding no constitutional
error when the victim’s teenage daughter may have accused the defendant of murder in a loud
and emotional display in front of the jury, defendant, and prosecutor).
114. Pachl v. Zenon, 929 P.2d 1088 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc).
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decision” and therefore would not warrant a new trial. In Nguyen v.
116
State, “the record contain[ed] no indication where the individuals
were sitting, whether they were seated together, or if the jurors did in
117
fact see the buttons.” Consequently, the reviewing court was unable
to determine whether it was “reasonably probable” that the buttons
118
influenced the jury’s verdict.
Other unsettled courts send mixed signals. For example, in State
119
v. McNaught,
the Kansas Supreme Court demonstrated a
willingness to approve of spectator demonstrations when it upheld
the defendant’s conviction, stating that “[t]he record in the
case . . . d[id] not show the factual circumstances present on this
issue. . . . [and t]he record [was] absolutely silent regarding the
number of MADD and SADD [Students Against Drunk Driving]
120
members . . . [that] wore buttons.” A later case by the Kansas
Supreme Court, however, signaled its disapproval of spectator
121
demonstrations. Reminding lower courts that an appellate court
cannot overturn convictions when the record is incomplete, it warned
that spectator demonstrations were “not a good idea,” and the
displays should have been removed because of the possibility of
122
prejudice.
Still other unsettled courts struggled to determine whether the
Supreme Court precedents in Holbrook v. Flynn and Estelle v.

115. Id. at 1093.
116. Nguyen v. State, 977 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
117. Id. at 457.
118. Id.; see also State v. Braxton, 477 S.E.2d 172, 177 (N.C. 1996) (“[T]his Court will not
assume a relationship exists between the murder victims and the spectators wearing the badges
and thereby infer their intention to influence the jury’s verdicts.”).
119. State v. McNaught, 713 P.2d 457 (Kan. 1986).
120. Id. at 468.
121. State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 30 (Kan. 1998).
122. Id. at 30. The court noted the possibility that spectator demonstrations may lead to
prejudice:
In McNaught . . . . [w]e then determined that where the record did not show the
number of persons wearing buttons, or contain any evidence that the jurors showed
concern about the buttons, no prejudice or abuse of discretion resulted.
. . . As in McNaught, there was no evidence [in this case] regarding the number of
spectators wearing the buttons or t-shirts and also no evidence that the jurors were in
any way affected by the buttons or t-shirts. That being said, however, it would seem
that the wearing of such buttons or t-shirts is not a good idea because of the
possibility of prejudice which might result. Under the circumstances, it would have
been better for the district court to have ordered the buttons removed or the t-shirts
covered up.
Id. at 29–30 (citation omitted).
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Williams, which set out the “inherent prejudice” legal balancing
123
test, were supposed to apply to spectator demonstrations. The
inherent prejudice test establishes a constitutional violation when an
“unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into
124
125
play.” Some of both the pro-victim courts and the status-quo
126
courts have applied this test to spectator demonstrations, with
differing results, but many of the unsettled courts were unclear
whether the Supreme Court mandated the test for spectator
127
128
demonstrations. For example, in Billings v. Polk, the defendant
claimed that he was denied a fair trial when “an alternate juror wore
a T-shirt one day during trial that said ‘No Mercy—No Limits,’ and
129
members of the jury saw and joked about the T-shirt.” The state
court “concluded that these facts, even if proven true, were
130
insufficient to entitle [the defendant] to relief.” Upon review, the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that the U.S.
Supreme Court had not “clearly establish[ed] that a jury’s exposure to
a T-shirt like the one at issue here amount[ed] to a violation of a
131
defendant’s constitutional rights.” This flux among lower courts and
the question regarding the applicability of the inherent prejudice test
apparently led the Supreme Court to consider the issue in 2006.
123. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (2006); see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560,
570 (1986) (“The only question we need answer is thus whether the presence of these four
uniformed and armed officers was so inherently prejudicial that respondent was thereby denied
his constitutional right to a fair trial.”); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512, 505 (1976)
(holding that “the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an
accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes” because “an
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play”).
124. Williams, 425 U.S. at 505.
125. See, e.g., In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 617 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (“Many courts have
used the Holbrook standard and have found that no inherent prejudice exists so as to taint the
defendant’s right to fair trial from the wearing of buttons or other displays. . . . We conclude, in
sum, that Woods does not meet the burden of proving that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced
by the trial court’s action in allowing members of the victims’ families to wear the black and
orange ribbons in the courtroom.” (citations omitted)).
126. See, e.g., Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that “Women
Against Rape” buttons constituted an unacceptably high risk of prejudice).
127. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (2006) (“Reflecting the lack of guidance from
this Court, lower courts have diverged widely in their treatment of defendants’ spectatorconduct claims. Some courts have applied Williams and Flynn to spectators’ conduct. Other
courts have declined to extend Williams and Flynn to spectators’ conduct.” (citations omitted)).
128. Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2006).
129. Id. at 246.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 247; see also id. at 248 n.6 (“[I]t is not even clear precisely what message, if any,
the words ‘No Mercy—No Limits’ conveyed . . . .”).
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II. THE DEBATE: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS VERSUS DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
In 2006, after more than twenty years of variance among the
lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carey v.
Musladin, which involved a spectator demonstration. Although it
seemed that with this case the Supreme Court would finally resolve
the issue of spectator demonstrations, the Court merely perpetuated
uncertainty with its decision. This Part introduces the Supreme
Court’s decision and describes how the decision gave limited
guidance to lower courts dealing with spectator demonstrations. This
Part also illustrates conflicting views of the practice using anecdotal
data from sixteen prosecutors who agreed to be interviewed on this
132
topic. Because prosecutors act in the best interest of the state,
confer with defense attorneys, answer to judges, and have
133
relationships with crime victims or surviving family members, they
can help shed light upon the multiple views and perspectives behind
spectator demonstrations. By evaluating the contentious elements of
the spectator demonstrations debate from this anecdotal perspective,
this Part lays the groundwork for Part III, which challenges these
demonstrations.
A. Carey v. Musladin
134

In Carey v. Musladin, the defendant stood trial for murder.
During the trial, “several members of [the victim’s] family sat in the
front row of the spectators’ gallery” wearing buttons depicting the
135
victim that were visible to the jury. Defense counsel moved to order
136
the removal of the buttons, but the judge refused. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that “the state
court’s application of a test for inherent prejudice that differed from
the one stated in Williams and Flynn ‘was contrary to clearly

132. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.”).
133. For a summary of the inherent problems with prosecutorial neutrality in dealing with
victims, see Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49
HOW. L.J. 475, 483–86 (2006) (noting that prosecutors face external pressures, including “the
often vocal concerns of the community or particular advocacy groups, such as victims’ rights
groups”); Medwed, supra note 12, at 145–47 (explaining that prosecutors may “naturally
develop an allegiance to—and affinity for—the crime victims in their cases”).
134. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 651 (2006).
135. See id. at 651 & n.1 (“The buttons were two to four inches in diameter.”).
136. Id. at 652.
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established federal law and constituted an unreasonable application
137
of that law.’”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue, but quickly
disposed of the case in a little over one page. The Court held that
Williams and Flynn, having only dealt with “state-sponsored
138
courtroom practices,” did not answer the question of whether the
inherent prejudice test applies to “private-actor courtroom
139
conduct.” Therefore, the lower courts were not required to follow
any particular test and the lower court’s decision was not “contrary to
140
or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”
As a consequence of the majority’s opinion in Carey v. Musladin,
lower courts were assured that the inherent prejudice test, or any
legal balancing test for that matter, did not automatically apply. On
the other hand, the majority had seemingly failed to establish an
alternative uniform standard for the lower courts to follow.
Fortunately, the three justices who filed concurring opinions—
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter—offered insight into the
competing concerns regarding spectator demonstrations. Justice
Kennedy seemed to support a case-by-case analysis when dealing
with spectator demonstrations but also thought that courts should
141
consider ending the practice all together. He stated, “[T]here [was]
no indication [in this case] . . . of coercion or intimidation to the
142
severe extent demonstrated in [Sheppard and Estes]. But “[it] does
present the issue whether as a preventative measure, or as a general
rule to preserve the calm and dignity of a court, buttons proclaiming a
message relevant to the case ought to be prohibited as a matter of
143
course.”
Both Justices Stevens and Souter also favored a case-by-case
approach but advocated applying the inherent prejudice test to both

137. Id. (quoting Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2005)). The
defendant in Carey was prosecuted in state court, but the federal district court eventually
“granted [the defendant] a certificate of appealability on the buttons issue.” Id.
138. Id. at 653 (“In Williams, the State compelled the defendant to stand trial in prison
clothes, and in Flynn, the State seated the troopers immediately behind the defendant.”).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 654 (“Reflecting the lack of guidance from this Court, lower courts have diverged
widely in their treatment of defendants’ spectator-conduct claims.”).
141. Id. at 656–57 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
142. Id. at 657.
143. Id.
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state-sponsored practices and private actors’ conduct. In applying
the test, however, Justice Souter stated, “one could not seriously deny
that allowing spectators at a criminal trial to wear visible buttons with
the victim’s photo can raise a risk of improper considerations. . . . The
only debatable question is whether the risk in a given case reaches the
145
‘unacceptable’ level.” He continued, “[T]wo considerations keep me
from concluding that the state court acted unreasonably . . . . in failing
146
to embrace a no-risk standard.” “First, of the several courts that
have considered the influence of spectators’ buttons, the majority
147
Second, “in the absence of
have left convictions standing.”
developed argument it would be preferable not to decide whether
protection of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised by
148
spectators’ buttons.” Although Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
Souter’s adoption of the inherent prejudice test and the sentiment
about the lower courts, he failed to find merit in the First
149
Amendment argument.
But Justices Stevens’ and Souter’s reluctance to assume “that
every trial and reviewing judge . . . was unreasonable as well as
150
mistaken in failing to embrace a no-risk standard” underestimates
the complexity of the issue. As discussed in Part I.C, some trial courts
before Carey v. Musladin were unsure whether they were bound by
151
the inherent prejudice test, and other courts did not rule on the
substantive issue of spectator demonstrations because the records
152
were incomplete. Consequently, the debate about the validity of

144. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 657 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment).
145. Id. at 657–58 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
146. Id. at 658.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Justice Stevens dismissed the First Amendment argument:
[M]y reasons for joining the Court’s judgment in this case are essentially the same as
those expressed by Justice Souter, with one caveat. In my opinion, there is no merit
whatsoever to the suggestion that the First Amendment may provide some measure
of protection to spectators in a courtroom who engage in actual or symbolic speech to
express any point of view about an ongoing proceeding.
Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
150. Id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); accord id. at 656 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (adopting Justice Souter’s rationale).
151. See supra Parts I.C.1–2; supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part I.C.3. Furthermore, State v. Speed, State v. Braxton, State v. Lord, and
Nguyen v. State, all cases that Justice Souter uses to demonstrate a lack of overturned
convictions, came from courts whose approach was unsettled. See supra Part I.C.3.
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spectator demonstrations is still very much alive, and Carey v.
Musladin has left open an opportunity for reform in this area.
153

B. Prosecutorial Perspectives

The culture has evolved in terms of the victim’s presence in the
process. Victim input is a positive change because it keeps the victim
informed, raises public confidence, and prevents misconceptions. On
the other hand, however, it is not appropriate to allow victims to
154
decide cases . . . [T]hat would border vigilantism.

All of the prosecutors who were interviewed for this Note
understood the tension that spectator demonstrations cause between
victims’ rights and defendants’ constitutional rights. In evaluating the
data, three common prosecutorial positions on the practice surfaced.
First, some supported spectator demonstrations and did not believe
demonstrations negatively influence the jury (supportive
prosecutors). Second, some preferred to evaluate all cases on a caseby-case basis because they believed that some but not all spectator
demonstrations may affect the jury (case-by-case prosecutors). Third,
some wished to abolish spectator conduct all together because of the
influence it may have on the jury (abolitionist prosecutors). The
following excerpts reveal the arguments proposed by each group and
give some perspective on the competing interests that surround
spectator demonstrations.
The majority of those from the interview sample who constituted
the supportive prosecutor group were domestic violence prosecutors.
Regardless of region, political ideology, office, and number of cases
tried, the domestic violence prosecutors interviewed overwhelmingly
favored spectator demonstrations. Whether this support stemmed
from their relationships with victims or the nature of their cases is
155
unclear, but their message was unambiguous: “Most [jurors] would
153. Sixteen prosecutors were interviewed for this Note. See supra note 23.
154. Interview with Prosecutor No. 3 (Nov. 8, 2007).
155. Interestingly, all of the domestic violence prosecutors concur: “The strength of
domestic violence cases, unlike others, relies heavily on the availability of the victim. We usually
have more contact with victims and want that contact. There are so many things working against
us.” This difficulty may fuel their desire to have victim participation in every stage of the
prosecution. Interview with Prosecutor No. 4 (Nov. 9, 2007); Interview with Prosecutor No. 9
(Nov. 30, 2007); Interview with Prosecutor No. 10 (Dec. 14, 2007); see also, e.g., Cheryl Hanna,
No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996) (discussing the need for participation from domestic violence
victims to “improv[e] the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence”).
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assume that the family and friends of the victim would be in support
of that victim. Those things don’t intimidate juries or move them to
do things that they wouldn’t otherwise do. So, it doesn’t have any
156
implications on a fair trial.” Similarly, another domestic violence
prosecutor noted, “I don’t think [spectator conduct is] inflammatory,
not at all. To deny them the ability to wear something just with a face
on it . . . that’s [what is] inflammatory. The jury knows that the family
157
is hurting.” Another put herself in the shoes of the victim’s family
members: “If it was my son who was murdered, I would not want
anyone to tell me what I could and couldn’t wear. Wearing a t-shirt or
158
something, that would probably be cathartic for me.” Importantly,
not all of the prosecutors who favored spectator demonstrations did
domestic violence work, but, commonly, the supportive prosecutors
emphasized the “rights” of the spectators, similar to the First
159
Amendment argument proposed by Justice Souter, and also, the
reality that families of crime victims are distraught.
Based on those interviewed, the case-by-case prosecutors
consisted of a wide variety of prosecutors, including conservatives,
liberals, women, and men. As the most diverse group, their primary
concerns were the spectators’ motives, the number of spectators
making the demonstration, and the ostentatious nature of the
displays. One prosecutor, in adopting a position very similar to the
inherent prejudice standard, said,
[Spectator conduct] is definitely inflammatory but I’m not sure that
it violates the defendant’s rights. If it’s just a picture, and not a
picture of the murder scene or a slogan that says ‘You murdered my
son,’ I could understand it. But in one case, the family wanted to
hold up huge signs. The judge had them removed and I agreed with
160
that.

Many of these prosecutors were very specific about pictures. One
said, “Definitely no murder scenes or dead victims, no words on the
pictures . . . but just pictures, like old pictures of the person – that’s
161
ok.” Others asked questions when asked to comment on the buttons
in Carey v. Musladin, indicating that certain details would change
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Interview with Prosecutor No. 3, supra note 154.
Interview with Prosecutor No. 9, supra note 155.
Interview with Prosecutor No. 4, supra note 155.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
Interview with Prosecutor No. 4, supra note 155.
Interview with Prosecutor No. 9, supra note 155.
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their position on whether the demonstrations should have been
162
allowed. One prosecutor said, “How big are the buttons?” Another,
after hearing about Carey v. Musladin, replied, “Were they baby
163
pictures on the buttons or adult pictures?”
Lastly, the abolitionist prosecutors, also a very diverse group,
encompassed almost all of the liberal and larger-city prosecutors
interviewed. This group was by far the strongest in their beliefs. For
example, when told about the spectators’ buttons in Carey v.
Musladin, one prosecutor immediately said, “No. No–I wouldn’t
allow that. Do I think it’s so overwhelmingly prejudicial? That’s so
difficult to prove. But I would not allow sympathy votes because of
164
victims in the courtroom.” Another noted, “[T]hese common links
can unnecessarily speak to the jury throughout the trial and it’s not
165
from a lawyer or someone that has been sworn in to testify.” One
prosecutor explained,
People think that defendants get too many rights. I don’t think so. I
understand that people think that the victim is forgotten because the
jury looks at the defendant all day. But speaking on behalf of the
166
victim in trial is my job, not [the job of] the victim themselves.

Another laments,
There’s a reason that the criminal justice system is supposed to be at
arm’s length. With buttons and things you are trying to sway the
jury, [symbolically] to get [a] message across [that is not expressly
allowed]. I don’t know if you’ve ever been through voir dire, but
seventy percent of the questions are “can you be fair,” “can you
keep an open mind throughout the entire trial?” Why then you
would allow that to happen indirectly [through buttons] is beyond
167
me!

Still other abolitionists were less worried about the potential
prejudice and more concerned about the practical implications of
allowing the spectator conduct. For example, one prosecutor noted,
“I’d ask them to take it off because it isn’t worth the case coming

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Interview with Prosecutor No. 10, supra note 155.
Interview with Prosecutor No. 13 (Dec. 14, 2007).
Interview with Prosecutor No. 5 (Nov. 15, 2007).
Interview with Prosecutor No. 1 (Nov. 8, 2007).
Interview with Prosecutor No. 6 (Nov. 15, 2007).
Interview with Prosecutor No. 8 (Nov. 16, 2007).
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168

back for something like that.” Another was influenced by his
experience in a case he tried: “[The victim’s family] just didn’t get it.
Their son was not totally innocent in the case [even though he was the
one that was killed]. That was just one of the reasons I didn’t think
169
they should wear those ribbons.” This prosecutor also mentioned
that judges sometimes put the onus of correcting the practice on the
prosecutor:
When the judge called us into his chambers [to discuss the ribbonwearing family in the spectator’s gallery] he basically said, “I’m not
going to tell these victims’ families that they cannot wear some
common ribbons if they want to.” Then he turned to me, “But Mr.
Prosecutor, I do think this is a dirty pull.” In truth, [the judge] didn’t
170
want to be the bad guy.

*

*

*

As this Part illustrates, courts and prosecutors have multiple
perspectives of and varying opinions about spectator demonstrations.
Particularly, defendants’ rights, victims’ rights, and the possible jury
effects are at the forefront of this ongoing discussion. Part III tackles
these issues and concludes that a complete ban on spectator
demonstrations in criminal courtrooms is the only way to ensure the
presumption of innocence.
III. THE UNACCEPTABLE RISK: ERODING THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
171

Although many legal actors, including lower courts
and
172
173
judges,
prosecutors,
the concurring Justices in Carey v.
174
175
Musladin, and defense attorneys, have some reservations about

168. Interview with Prosecutor No. 16 (Dec. 21, 2007). When the prosecutor said “have the
case come back,” he was noting that if the trial court allowed the spectator display, the appellate
court would reverse the conviction due to prejudice, and he would have to retry the case.
169. Interview with Prosecutor No. 1, supra note 165.
170. Id.
171. For a description of the positions of courts in the status-quo group and at least one of
the courts in the unsettled group, see supra Parts I.C.1, 3.
172. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
173. For a description of the perspectives of prosecutors, see supra Part II.B.
174. See supra Part II.A.
175. See, e.g., Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 3, Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006) (No.05-785), 2006 WL
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176

spectator demonstrations, some members of these groups are still
reluctant to completely ban the practice. Two central legal concerns
fuel this reluctance. First, Justice Souter and the supportive group of
prosecutors, for example, are especially concerned about the victim’s
or spectator’s potential right to free speech. Second, there are varying
opinions regarding whether a courtroom display from the spectators’
gallery can actually affect the jury’s verdict. This Part addresses these
legal issues by first dispelling the First Amendment argument that
spectator rights must be balanced with a defendant’s rights and then,
most importantly, arguing that spectator demonstrations do create
remarkable potential for biased jury verdicts.
A. The Unnecessary Balancing Act
The First Amendment mandates that “Congress shall make no
177
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” It is one of the people’s
178
most cherished rights in the United States. Fittingly then, many
supporters of spectator demonstrations are concerned that
eliminating a victim’s or spectator’s right to demonstrate may
constitute an unconstitutional restraint on free speech. Some
advocate balancing the victim’s First Amendment right with the
179
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and impartial jury,
and even Justice Souter noted in Carey v. Musladin, “[I]n the absence
of developed argument it would be preferable not to decide whether
the protection of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised
180
by spectators’ buttons.” But, upon reviewing the law regarding the
First Amendment in the criminal courtroom, it is evident that First
Amendment rights succumb to other, more important trial interests.
2430574 (“There is no conceivable version of a just and fair trial that includes the regular,
deliberate intrusion of such [public displays of emotion by spectators] into the trial process.”).
176. In the minority are those who seemingly have no qualms with spectator
demonstrations. For a description of the positions of pro-victim courts, see supra Part I.C.2.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
178. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 381–
82 (1973) (“There is little need to reiterate that the freedoms of speech and of the press rank
among our most cherished liberties.”).
179. See, e.g., Terri A. Belanger, Note, Symbolic Expression in the Courtroom: The Right to
a Fair Trial Versus Freedom of Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318, 344–52 (1994) (discussing
the exclusion of individuals from courtrooms and advocating for a balancing test of their First
Amendment rights with the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights); see also Neb. Press Ass’n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (“The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign
priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to
the other.”).
180. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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The Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant “the
181
right to a speedy and public trial.” In particular, the Court values
the public aspect of the trial because it “assur[es] that the proceedings
182
A public trial
[are] conducted fairly to all concerned.”
“discourage[s] perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions
183
based on secret bias or partiality.” Consequently, the Supreme
Court has recognized the right of the press to access the courtroom
184
under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the Court stated, “While
maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this
important function in a democratic society its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the
185
judicial process.” The Court recognized that sometimes the public
aspect of the system may itself encourage misconduct, bias, or
186
partiality, thereby violating the right to an impartial jury.
Consequently, after interpreting the Sixth Amendment to guarantee
that every “verdict [is] based upon the evidence developed at the
187
trial,” the Court has, in certain circumstances, excluded the media

181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
182. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 570 (“We reaffirm that the guarantees of
freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition [against excluding the press] under all
circumstances, but the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption against its use
continues intact.”).
185. Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
186. The Court has warned trial courts that news coverage poses a danger:
[W]e note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become
increasingly prevalent. . . . Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and
the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial
courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against
the accused.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
187. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (reversing the defendant’s conviction after
significant unfavorable publicity about his crime circulated in the community prior to trial).
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and other third parties from the courtroom. Some courts have
189
excluded spectators altogether.
Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Norris, spectator
demonstrators request far different privileges than those who simply
190
assert the right to receive information. Trial spectators seek a “more
191
active role: to make a statement about [the defendant’s] guilt.”
Notably, this adjudicative speech, or “speech intended to influence
192
court decisions,” is heavily constrained in the courtroom. In fact,
some argue that a trial by definition is one vast restriction of speech.
Take for example the following explanation:
Trials, of course, are highly structured affairs, in which there appears
to be quite little free speech. There are elaborate rules about who
goes when, about who speaks, and about who does not
speak. . . . [T]he law of evidence that deals with relevance and
materiality can [also] be thought of as a prohibition on speech, a
prohibition on saying what (a judge believes) is irrelevant to the
particular matter at hand. Those who persist in saying irrelevant
things after a ruling by the judge risk punishment for contempt.
In much the same way, testimony at trial may be suppressed
because the matters with which it deals were secured in violation of
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments, or because the testimony is
hearsay, not the best evidence, or not preceded and supported by an

188. See, e.g., Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393–94 (1979) (upholding the trial
court’s exclusion of the press from the courtroom). Likewise, the Court has chastised trial courts
for allowing press coverage or involvement to become prejudicial. See, e.g., Sheppard, 384 U.S.
at 355, 362–63 (reversing the conviction because the enormous amount of publicity prevented
the defendant from receiving a fair trial when “newsmen took over practically the entire
courtroom”); Estes, 381 U.S. at 550, 552 (reversing a conviction in which the trial judge’s
decision to televise the pretrial hearing and otherwise permit excessive media coverage
prejudiced the defendant and noting that the courtroom “was a mass of wires, television
cameras, microphones and photographers”).
189. The Second Circuit, for example, has accepted that courts may ban disorderly
spectators from the courtroom:
The guarantee of a public trial does not mean that all of the public is entitled under
all circumstances to be present during the trial. It means only that the public must be
freely admitted so long as those persons and groups who make up the public remain
silent and behave in an orderly fashion . . . . When the trial judge has reason to
believe that . . . spectators are disorderly and may continue to be so he may exclude
[them].
United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir. 1965).
190. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990).
191. Id.
192. Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV.
705, 705 (2004).
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appropriate foundation. If we were to move our thinking about what
happens at a trial away from the category ‘trials’ and into the
category ‘free speech,’ it would appear that the very institution we
call a trial exists by virtue of an elaborate system of restrictions on
the freedom of speech . . . .
The point of the foregoing . . . is to illustrate the fact that our
notion of freedom of speech is less expansive than we typically
193
think . . . .

As this passage indicates, restrictions on adjudicative speech
occur all the time in the courtroom, and courts do not find it
194
constitutionally controversial. The Supreme Court’s justification in
195
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada supports this point.
The outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by impartial jurors,
who know as little as possible of the case, based on material
admitted into evidence before them in a court proceeding. . . . It is
unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial
proceeding, whatever right to “free speech” an attorney has is
196
extremely circumscribed.

These sentiments emphasize that “conclusions to be reached in a case
will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not
197
by any outside influence.” Therefore, “in the interest of the fair
198
administration of justice,” courts may impose “reasonable time,
199
place, and manner restrictions”
on spectator conduct.
Consequently, the First Amendment “must be curtailed at the
200
courthouse door” if society is to espouse the goal of producing fair
trials for criminal defendants.

193. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687,
689–90 (1997).
194. Peters, supra note 192, at 725.
195. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
196. Id. at 1070–01 (distinguishing between “in court” and “out of court” restrictions on
speech); see also Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 928–29 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Under our current system,
the trial judge is charged with preserving the decorum that permits a reasoned resolution of
issues. Zealous counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of the First Amendment.”).
197. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
198. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980).
199. Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 833 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990).
200. Id. at 832.
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B. Practical Implications: The Jury
Although victims lack a First Amendment basis to argue for
spectator demonstrations as a right, the question remains, can
spectator demonstrations really make a difference in trial outcomes?
Three concepts from the field of psychology—attention, priming
effects, and the availability heuristic—provide evidence that spectator
demonstrations will bias a jury. Furthermore, research suggests that
these effects are uniform whether the demonstration is a ribbon,
button, T-shirt, or urn.
First, as the Court in Estes recognized, juror distraction may lead
201
to prejudice, because jurors’ minds may focus on the distraction
202
rather than the testimony. Attention plays a huge role in memory
and therefore decisionmaking. One well-accepted theory of attention,
the capacity model, assumes that the mind has a finite capacity for
203
information at a given time. Consequently, the more attention used
for one thing, such as reading spectator buttons, the less those
resources are available for something else, such as evaluating the
credibility of a witness. Furthermore, as various studies demonstrate,
jurors already tend to pay attention to many things during the course
of a trial that are irrelevant to the facts of the case. For example, the
204
205
206
defendant’s attractiveness or race and the lawyer’s sex or

201. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 546 (1965).
202. Id.
203. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND EFFORT 7–8 (1973) (“[A] capacity theory
assumes that there is a general limit on man’s capacity to perform mental work. It also assumes
that this limited capacity can be allocated with considerable freedom among concurrent
activities.”).
204. See, e.g., Billy Thornton, Effects of Rape Victim’s Attractiveness in a Jury Simulation, 3
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 666, 666 (1977) (testing the hypothesis that a rape
victim’s attractiveness may influence the decisions of jurors and finding that it did affect the
defendant’s punishment).
205. See, e.g., Michael J. Sargent & Amy L. Bradfield, Race and Information Processing in
Criminal Trials: Does the Defendant’s Race Affect How the Facts are Evaluated?, 30
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 995, 1003 (2004) (“Consistent with the hypothesis
that a defendant’s race could affect observers’ sensitivity to informational factors, the present
studies demonstrated that under conditions designed to elicit relatively low motivation, the
impact of legally relevant information was often greater when the defendant was Black than
when he was White.”).
206. See, e.g., Nora K. Villemur & Janet Shibley Hyde, Effects of Sex of Defense Attorney,
Sex of Juror, and Age and Attractiveness of the Victim on Mock Juror Decision Making in a Rape
Case, 9 SEX ROLES 879, 885–86 (1983) (“The most striking result of this study was that
significantly more not-guilty verdicts were given when the defense attorney was female (71%)
than when the defense attorney was male (49%).”).
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207

presentation style all distract the jury and potentially prejudice the
jury’s decisionmaking. Unlike those factors, however, spectator
conduct can be eliminated easily to prevent the possible biasing effect
of the distraction.
Second, a juror may not only be distracted from the case by
attending to a spectator demonstration, but the display may also act
as a prime for subsequent decisionmaking behavior. Priming refers to
“a facilitation or bias in performance as the result of recently
208
encountered information.” An experiment by Professors Morrison,
209
Wheeler, and Smeesters helps to illustrate the concept. After
distinguishing between high and low self-monitors (people who tend
210
to use external cues and people who do not, respectively), the
researchers presented the question, “How and under what conditions
211
do significant others affect the goals that people pursue?” In the
experiment, the researchers gathered participants whose mothers had
high achievement goals for them but who did not have high
212
achievement goals for themselves. Then, the researchers subjected
213
them to a mother prime. For example, they asked the participants
about their mother’s appearance, typical activities, and place of
214
birth. The researchers found that the high self-monitors performed
better than controls on a subsequent achievement test because when
provided with an external cue (their mothers) they unconsciously

207. See, e.g., Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation
Style, Attorney Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 533, 548
(1996) (“Aggressive attorneys were found to be more successful than passive attorneys . . . .”).
208. R. REED HUNT & HENRY C. ELLIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
117 (7th ed. 2004). To illustrate priming, psychologists often use the example taken from an
experiment by the scientist Marcel in 1980. E.g., id. at 84. The experiment asks the subject to
“decide as rapidly as possible” whether a string of letters represents a word. Id. When the word
doctor is presented, participants are much faster in recognizing it as a word when it was
preceded by the word nurse rather than the word peach. Id. at 85. This suggests that the related
word can contribute to the recognition of the next word. Id.
209. Kimberly Rios Morrison, S. Christian Wheeler & Dirk Smeesters, Significant Other
Primes and Behavior: Motivation to Respond to Social Ques Moderates Pursuit of PrimeInduced Goals, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 1661, 1664 (2007).
210. Id. at 1663 (“High self-monitors are social chameleons who tend to use external cues
(e.g., from the situation, from other people) to guide their behavior. Low self-monitors, in
contrast, rely primarily on internal cues, such as their attitudes and beliefs, in deciding how to
behave.”).
211. Id. at 1671.
212. Id. at 1664.
213. Id. at 1665.
214. Id.

ELIZABETH.DOC

306

10/31/2008 1:20:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:275
215

altered their behavior to match that of their mothers’ goals.
Similarly, Professors Morrison, Wheeler, and Smeesters duplicated
their results in an experiment with college students whose roommates
216
wanted them to keep their living spaces clean. After a priming
manipulation, the high self-monitors pursued the cleanliness goal
217
even when they did not hold that goal for themselves. This research
supports the theory that priming can alter one’s behavior and “[the
level of] self-monitoring can moderate the extent to which external
218
stimuli automatically affect behavior.” Applying both studies to jury
behavior, one can foresee how spectators who visibly display their
goals, such as convicting the defendant, can prime certain members of
the jury and in turn unconsciously alter their behavior.
Third, allowing spectator demonstrations from the gallery also
disrupts the balance of the courtroom. The American criminal justice
system is set up as an adversarial system, which “according to most
definitions, consists of three features: a neutral and passive decisionmaker, party presentation of evidence, and a highly structured
219
procedure.” Correspondingly, one of the main arguments in Payne
220
v. Tennessee,
the case favoring victim impact statements at
sentencing hearings, was the importance of a balanced system. In
comparing the defense to the prosecution, the Court said, “virtually
no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital
221
defendant may introduce.” Therefore, “[t]he State has a legitimate
222
interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence.” This argument,
that a fair system should assign a one-to-one ratio, is deeply rooted in
the criminal justice process. For example, each side makes an opening
statement, there are direct and cross examinations, and each side
makes a closing statement. This balancing is not only equitable, but it
also combats the availability heuristic.

215. Id. at 1665–66.
216. Id. at 1666.
217. Id. at 1666–69.
218. Id. at 1663; see also id. at 1673 (“[These findings] provide insight into [how] being
reminded of mothers, roommates, and other important people will cause people to act in ways
consistent (or sometimes even inconsistent) with what these individuals would like to see.”).
219. Stephen G. Coughlan, The “Adversary System”: Rhetoric or Reality?, CAN. J.L. &
SOC’Y, Fall 1993, at 139, 142.
220. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
221. Id. at 822.
222. Id. at 825 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 517 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)).
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The availability heuristic states that a judgment can be
223
“influenced by the ease with which something is brought to mind.”
For example, in the wake of a major airplane crash, people are more
anxious about flying even though statistically it is the safest time to
224
225
fly. The thought itself helps to bias the subsequent actions.
“[W]hatever most occupies juror attention during the trial will most
influence what jurors focus on during deliberations and
226
disproportionately use in rendering a verdict.” Notably, information
that is presented early in the trial tends to “remain[] vivid and is more
227
apt to be used for interpreting subsequent evidence.” Furthermore,
in interpreting evidence, jurors tend to “construct a story that
228
confirms their prior beliefs.” This data elucidates the importance of
equality in the courtroom. If spectators’ buttons or T-shirts are
allowed, a juror may disproportionately recall the hurt and
devastation of the victim and their family or buttress their desire to
seek justice for the family, which may in turn diminish the jurors’
ability to remain impartial.
Given that the American criminal justice system otherwise goes
to great lengths to avoid jury bias, jurors should ultimately make
decisions based on the evidence at trial and not the sympathetic
nature of the victim or the spectator’s loss. For example, the voir dire
process and rules against the admission of the defendant’s previous
229
crimes are meant to filter out potential bias and prevent the jury
230
from acting on an irrational basis. It would be unjust to circumvent
these goals by allowing prejudicial spectator demonstrations.
Furthermore, because the display itself adds an element of
distraction, may prime the jury, and may create an availability
heuristic, employing a balancing test that allows certain or limited
spectator demonstrations misses the point. T-shirts, buttons, or
223. HUNT & ELLIS, supra note 208, at 359.
224. Id.
225. Id.; see also Craig R. Fox, The Availability Heuristic in the Classroom: How Soliciting
More Criticism Can Boost Your Course Ratings, 1 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 86, 87–89
(2006) (discussing the availability heuristic and how it affects graduate students’ assessments of
their classes).
226. David A. Wenner & Gregory S. Cusimano, Combating Juror Bias, TRIAL, June 2000, at
30, 38.
227. Id. at 37.
228. Id.
229. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 167 (2008) (“The purpose of conducting voir dire is to secure an
impartial jury.”).
230. Peters, supra note 192, at 758.
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urns—no matter how many exist—have the ability to take the focus
away from the trial and bias the jury. Therefore, only a complete ban
on spectator demonstrations can secure a defendant’s right to a fair
trial.
CONCLUSION
The presumption of innocence makes up the core of the
231
American criminal justice system. Consequently, a victim’s right
should never come at the expense of a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Musladin, the law
in this area is ripe for reform, and this Note contends that allowing
spectator demonstrations in courtrooms creates a per se unacceptable
risk. This Note does not dismiss the fact that victims’ rights should
allow a victim to be present, heard, and respected throughout judicial
proceedings. It simply recognizes that juries are “likely to be
232
impregnated by the environing atmosphere,” and it mandates that
233
“at the very least,” evidence should “come from the witness
234
235
stand” and courtrooms should be free from “public passion.”
Spectator demonstrations contravene all of these principles.
Juries must already combat prejudicial pitfalls that present
themselves in the criminal justice system, and adding yet another
temptation unrelated to the facts of the case is unwarranted. This
Note urges courts to be mindful that although allowing spectator
demonstrations give some victims comfort, the demonstrations only
create more victims in the long run—those who end up in prison for
someone else’s crime.
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